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1999 is an oddly rich year for remembering.  In Berlin, the citythat is my
home this year, it is the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall.  It is
the fiftieth anniversary of the rebirth of Germany.  It is the fiftieth anniversary
of  Mao's China.  And it is ten years since the image of a brave but foolish
Chinese student standing defiantly before a tank became for us the image of
Tiannamen.
It is also for us an anniversary of a different sort.  It is a decade  since
"Internet time" began.  Though it's harder here to mark moments, and though
of course the Internet technically lived long before  1989, it was not until the
early 1990s that the Internet became an idea in the minds of ordinary people.
In  CERN,  Tim  Berners-Lee  was just describing  the protocol that would
become the World Wide Web.  Microsoft was just readying release of Win-
dows 3.
Decades  are good lengths of time  for marking moments  of reflection.
They  are  long  enough to  give perspective,  yet not so long  as  to  absolve
responsibility.  If it was the last ten years, then they are years that we are in
a sense responsible for.  If it is the next ten years, then they are years we
should certainly be responsible for.
In the next few minutes, I want to think about this responsibility and this
change.  The decade ofthe 1990s has been the decade of an important kind of
freedom.  But we need to understand how.
To understand how, I want to begin long before the decade began.  I want
to begin where the Republic began, with a passage from a letter of Thomas
Jefferson that, in an important way, captures both the hope and the error of
our time.  Said Jefferson:
If  nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclu-
sive property, it is the action of  the thinking power called an idea, which
an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps itto himself, but
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the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of everyone,
and the receiver cannot dispossess himselfofit. Its peculiar character, too,
is that no one possesses the less, because every other possess the whole of
it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without
lessening mine;  as he who lites his taper at mine, receives light without
darkening me.  That ideas should freely spread from one to another over
the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement
of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed
by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, with-
out lessening their  density at any point, and like the air in which we
breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable ofconfinement, or
exclusive appropriation.  Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of
property.,
Jefferson's hope is the dream of the Enlightenment: That ideas, and their
creativity, were  subject to a different law of nature.  Property,  or ordinary
property at least, gets consumed.  If you harvest my field, I cannot.  If  you use
my car, then I am unable to.  Ordinary property is subject to these constraints
of nature.  To the  dismal  science  of economics,  which must use price to
allocate the scarce, scarcity incents production.
But ideas are different.  They live, as Jefferson said, according to differ-
ent rules.  He who  receives an idea from me  "receives  instruction himself
without lessening mine, as he who lites his taper at mine receives lite without
darkening me."  Ideas spread without control, and culture and knowledge with
it, because they live life  under different rules.  Nature protects  ideas,  since
ideas cannot in nature, be a subject of property.
It is important for us to think a bit about what this enlightenment picture
was.  For we are likely to miss the essence of  its magic.  We think of Jefferson
as the idolizer of the yeoman farmer, frugal yet profitable in his  small yet
productive farms.  But the part of  Jefferson that I am talking about was not the
farmer part.  This part of Jefferson was the creator.  This part of Jefferson
thought the greatest in man came from his creativity.  It came from his ability
to build the  new, in music,  in art, in government.  This  part of Jefferson
idolized the inspiration of genius, in all the ways that genius got expressed.
This is the ideal of the Enlightenment - that education would inspire some-
thing new.
But out of what?  Out of what  do we  build the new?  From what re-
sources? Using what ideas?
Here's where the economy that Jefferson spoke of  becomes so important.
We build new ideas out of  old ideas.  We create by taking what's been created
1.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13,1813), in VIWRrNGs
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1790-1826, at 180-81  (HA. Washington ed.,  1854) (quoted in Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,  8-9 n2 (1966)).THE DEATH OF CYBERSPACE
before.  We erect on top of foundations laid by others - a foundation of ideas
laid by others.  And a free society is that society where this building is some-
thing anyone can do.  Ideas get to run free - that is their nature - and anyone
gets to pick up an idea and carry it along.
This  is the picture of science:  Of thousands working  in parallel on a
common problem - whather the structure ofthe polio virus, or the cure for the
common  cold - thousands  working, in different  institutions,  with different
incentives, all allowed to carry on this work because nature makes it impossi-
ble to capture an idea, and keep it from others.
This is the picture of  philosophy: Ofthousands working on a common set
of problems  - problems that define  paradigms  in philosophy,  whether the
problem of free will, or the problem of intent - where each generation gets to
add  its  contribution,  layering  its  contribution  onto  that  of the generation
before, adding something new by building on the old.
This is the picture of music: Ofthousands working in a tradition, whether
classical,  or jazz, or rock - everyone free to create new music within that
tradition, taking parts from the old, and adding slight variations to the old.
Inventing, not by bringing something wholly new to the field, but by innovat-
ing on what went before.
This  is  the picture  of writing:  Of thousands  working  in a tradition,
whether defined by genre, or by an age, where creativity is always additions
to a past.  Where one marks the new through a slight variation on the past.
There are a number of  ideas that are bundled into these pictures that it is
important for us to identify and keep  separate.  One is the idea of a common
problem - a problem, or project, that is open to any of us to pursue.  If you
want to write jazz music, you don't need  permission from Guild of Jazz
Musicians.  If you want to complete the work of Bertrand  Russell,  finally
finding a foundation for mathematics, you don't need the permission of Rus-
sell's estate.  The polio virus is as open to you to understand and engineer as
it is to me.  Nothing in the virus creates  a distinction between us.  A virus is
in the common.  It is - to use a term that will be meaningful to some now, but
to everyone by the end of this short talk - open source.
The creative operates on projects that are in the commons.  That is the
first idea.  The second is that the creative operates  by taking in the old, and
transforming it into the new.  This economy, like any economy, has an input.
That input is the old.  Jazz is written based on jazz; work on the polio virus is
built upon work on the virus; we have a problem to work on about the founda-
tions of mathematics because Russell tried to build a foundation for mathe-
matics.  In each of  these domains, there is something we mark as creative.  But
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public domain or, as I will call it, in the commons, are essential to creativity.
The larger the commons, the greater the input into the creative.
Now Jefferson's thought was that these two elements would go together.
That it was in the nature of things that there would be thousands who could
work out a tradition; and that the inputs to this tradition would essentially be
free.
But the two hundred years  since  Jefferson  wrote have  shown us  how
contingent his vision was.  While formally, anyone can hazard a guess at the
nature of the polio virus,  realistically,  only those working in a lab  do; and
while formally anyone can be hired by a lab, realistically, only those with the
proper  education  are.  And  while  formally  anyone  can  get an education,
realistically, not everyone can pass biology.  Thus formally a problem might
be in the commons, but practically, it will only be a small set of  people who
actually are able to pick the problem up, and work it out.
And  historically,  of course,  it was not just talent that  distinguished
between those who could work on a problem and those who couldn't.  In some
societies,  the  government  determines  who  can  work  on  what  problems.
Science in the Soviet Union was not a project in the commons.  Nor, for that
matter, were  atomic energy or the study of encryption projects in the com-
mons in the United States.  If you try to do research on the nature of atomic
weapons outside of federal control, you are quite likely to find yourself right
quickly within federal control - namely the control of a federal penitentiary.
And for much of our history,  if you  wanted to work  on encryption,  you
worked for the government - that was where the money was, and that's where
the experts were.  If you tried to take what you learned and release it to the
public, you yourself would be removed  from the public.  Science here was
controlled.
But more than politics controls what problems  are really, or effectively,
within the commons.  Think about more practical limitations.  Say it's 1970,
and you want to write a political column that is critical of both the Republican
and Democratic parties, and that is sympathetic to communism in Cuba.  You
can write all you want, and you might find a mimeograph machine to copy
ugly blue copies of what you say.  But you're not likely to find a way to get
your  ideas  published  broadly  - to,  for  example,  a nationwide  audience.
National papers like the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal were just
becoming national at the time, and such a column was certainly not about to
find its way onto the op-ed pages of the Times.
Two constraints  are operating here, hand-in-glove.  The one is purely
economic - publishing and distribution costs lots of  money, and our hypotheti-
cal Castro-phile is not likely to have lots of money.  The other is editorial -
because only a bit gets published, there must be people who decide what bitTHE DEATH OF  CYBERSPACE
does get published.  Those people decide what gets published based on what
they believe is true, and which truths will maximize the income from their
publishing venture.
These constraints together restrict our hypothetical writer. He can create,
but to little end.  He can write, but with little important success.  The prob-
lems  of world politics  may be in the commons,  but these  institutions that
rationalize  economic  scarcity keep  the problems  effectively  far from  our
writer.
And not just writers.  The same constraints would limit a film producer.
If it were  1970, and you wanted to make a full-length film about the war in
Vietnam, you would be constrained not just by the politics of the film, but also
by the sheer expense and burden of its production.  Editing requires extremely
expensive equipment; only a few places would have this equipment; only the
few would be allowed to use it.
And then there are  constraints more human.  No expensive  equipment
stops people from being composers.  Anyone who sets his mind to it can learn
to compose.  But both the learning, and the translation of what is  composed
to performance, were, in the 1970s, prohibitively expensive.  To learn to speak
the language of music well enough to write; to write well enough to earn an
orchestra to play that music - these were the rewards to very few of the very
few who could afford to try.
The point in all these examples is very much the same: The creative may
be open to everyone in a formal sense; it may be the "nature" of ideas that I
can use yours without you being the worse for it. But in a real sense, for most
of our lives, there were other, very real constraints on the power of people to
create.  These constraints were economic - publishing limited by the cost of
publishing;  film producing, by the cost of production; they were educational -
only those with an education, and only a few were open to an education; they
were political,  or institutional - only those in certain institutions;  and they
were  personal - only those  who  learned  the language  of composing,  for
example, could engage the art of composing.
They together  constrained the creative.  Nature may have made  ideas
free; but other forces countermanded nature.
If you want to understand the real meaning ofthe freedom that the 1990s
gave; if  you want to understand what is truly amazing about the revolution we
are  currently living;  if you want to see why Jefferson would have  called it
important - then you  should understand  it against the background  of this
power to  create:  this  conspiracy of nature,  and these  forces that counter-
manded Jefferson's nature.
For the power of the digital revolution is not that you can buy books at
amazon.com  in just one-click; nor is it that you can surf a billion web pages,57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 337 (2000)
or spam a million innocent souls for just $50.  The power ofthis digital revol-
ution is that it removed, in its first generation, many ofthese constraints on the
creative.  Ideas would flow free, Jefferson said; the net made that possible.
- Writers don't need the permission of publishers to publish; everyone
with a net connection can be a publisher.
- Scientific  progress  need  not happen  within  single  institutions,  or
small communities of scholars.  It can be shared, and advanced, on a
network that reaches broadly and without discrimination.
- Music can be written; machines can translate it; composers need not
spend decades  writing scales before they can make music.
The revolution of the last decade was a revolution in the constraints that
made Jefferson's picture just an ideal, or effectively unreal.  The revolution
was  the  removal  of the  economic,  and  practical,  limitations  that  limited
creativity. A thousand flowers can now bloom, because the architecture of the
digital  revolution has protected  a significant part  of this growth from the
economics of real world constraints.
It is important to think about just what in the net makes these changes
possible.  Nature in this world does  more than nature in Jefferson's  world.
The architecture of the net makes it possible to distribute widely and cheaply;
no bottleneck  need constrain  this publication.  The architecture  of the net
makes it possible to coordinate  widely and extensively;  no organization,  or
hierarchy, is needed to make a common project possible.  And the character
of digital media makes it possible for images to be managed cheaply, cheaply
edited; no studio, or expensive film, need limit that possibility.
The nature of the net, its architecture,  its character, these together make
possible this  extraordinary  power  of creation.  They  together  deliver  the
Jefferson revolution.  They make real the promise of creativity.
I have detailed the elements of this real revolution - I have tried to make
them plain,  and clear - because in my view, this revolution is about to end.
This extraordinary promise of creative power vested in many, in the independ-
ent, in the different - this promise is about to end.
It is going to end not because the Internet will end.  Rather it is going to
end because law is about to kill it. What I do, what the people I train do, what
hundreds of thousands  of extremely well paid people like the people I train
do - we, lawyers, are in the process of  killing it.
We are not killing it because we are evil.  Or at least not the ones I train.
The death is coming about not through conspiracy or malice.  Rather the death
comes from a confusion we lawyers have, encouraged  as we are by clients
with lots of money, about the role of property in the process  of creativity.
And in the remaining  minutes of this brief hour, I want to sketch this confu-
sion, and show how it is countering Jefferson's revolution.THE DEATH OF CYBERSPACE
The outline of my argument is this: We lived in a world where economic
constraints sapped from most the ability to live the creativity that Jefferson imagined.  The initial architecture  of the Iternet took that constraint away.
My claim is that law is in the process  of recreating the constraints  that the
Internet removed.  Not through economic scarcity, but through a system of
rights,  called intellectual  property rights, that will  systematically  skew the
creative process:  Back to those who hold the most, away from those just now
enabled.
But more, first, about this confusion.
We live in the post-cold war era.  We hold dear certain ideas we think of
as lessons from that war.  One of these ideas is the sanctity of property.  We
believe that property is the engine of freedom.  We watched for two genera-
tions as whole regions of our world decayed because their governments denied
the importance of property.  We celebrate this year the tenth anniversary of
the liberation of those people from the tyranny of those systems.  We believe
that at the core of that liberation was the embrace of the importance of this
idea of property.  At its core, that is, we believe that this prosperity comes
from the embrace of property.
I have no argument with this view in general.  I have no quibble with the
importance of property to the free market system, and no hesitation in associ-
ating the free-market  system with freedom  generally.  I am the son of a
capitalist;  I was raised  on the ideals of the market;  I spent many months
wandering through the former communist nations when they were communist
nations, all the while believing that if only the state would free the people -
by recognizing and protecting property - their creativity, and potential, would
be realized.  I believed then,  as I believe now, that about the non-virtual
economy, this much is certain:  that strong and powerful property rights are
an important part of the engine of prosperity.
But now I want you to take note of an undeniable fact about our own
recent history.  It is commonplace  to argue that the Internet revolution has
done more to spur the American economy than any other single influence in
the past ten years.  Depending upon the numbers you credit, up to 25% of the
growth of the American  economy can be directly attributed to the Internet.
The Internet has been the center of our prosperity.  At a time when prosperity
seemed a dream from the past, it has given us again extraordinary excitement
and hope.
Yet let's not forget an important fact about the character of the Internet.
No space more shamelessly ignores the sanctity of property.  Pundits used to
say of USENET that it was the single largest copyright violation in the world;
I think we should be more general.  Cyberspace is the single largest location
of violations of intellectual property precepts of any place in human history.57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 337 (2000)
This space was born upon the denial of  intellectual property's premise.  It was
fed on a diet of  ignoring the claims of property and control that the IP lawyers
insisted upon. It thrived not by hoarding or protecting or sheltering ideas, and
creativity;  it thrived by giving it all away.  In contrast to real space, where
theft is policed and criminals go to jail, cyberspace is that place where theft
produced prosperity.
Let me show you how.  At the core of the technologies that spurred the
growth of the Internet is the technology we call the World Wide Web.  The
web is a protocol for linking documents on the Internet; it permits hyperlinks
among documents,  or did so at first.  Now it is more properly thought of as a
platform, upon which an extraordinary amount of commerce gets done.
The core of that technology is in effect a programming language - really
a text mark-up language, but one that functions as a programming language.
Web  pages  get built  in  something  called  HTML;  and  browsers  interpret
HTML when they render a web page as a web page.
Now copyright law protects HTML code, just like it protects the code of
Windows 95.  Technically, if you copy someone's  HTML source code, and
take it, you have violated their copyright, just as if you copy Word or Word-
Perfect, and take it, you have violated the copyright of Microsoft or Corel.
But the World Wide Web was built on just such takings.  And indeed, it
was  designed to facilitate them.  Every browser  even today  allows  you to
reveal the "source" of an HTML document; every browser allows you to copy
that source, and then, with an editor, to modify it as you like.  The web was
built on a platform that encouraged the '"theft" of other peoples'  works.  And
it was  because  of that encouraging,  and because  of this thet  that HTML
became so quickly the programming  language of choice.  This was an econ-
omy grounded on sharing; and this sharing produced the Internet.
The web is not an exception; the web is the rule.  The Internet was born
not in corporations, or law firms.  The Internet was born among researchers.
These  researchers  had as their  ideal not IPOs,  or beautiful  houses  in the
valley.  These researchers had as their ideal perfecting a network of connec-
tion.  The very protocols  of the Internet were protocols  of connection; they
were open, and free, and available for the taking.  Like HTML, this was code,
but not code protected by corporations; this was code that was  shared and
common.
Here too, the sharing produced growth.  Coding is complex;  getting it
right is hard; open code, and shared code, make it possible to get it right much
more easily.
And thus the great irony of the past decade.  As the East is learning the
prosperity of property, the West is enjoying the prosperity of no property.  As
the East is  constructing systems for protecting property so as to rebuild  anTHE DEATH OF  CYBERSPACE
economy and society, the West is building an economy and society in a space
where property does not reign.
Yet we haven't yet noticed this.  Instead, as this prosperity rages about
us, there are those who cry "the sky is falling."  From the start of the Internet
revolution, there have been those who have screamed that the economy will
die unless intellectual  property is better protected.  While we have seen the
greatest growth in the technology sector ever, there have been those who have
said that unless we protect IP better, no investment  will be made.  While
millions have written web pages, and coded code for the net, there have been
those who have said only in a world of safe and secure property will prosper-
ity occur.
These chicken littles have had their effect.  For in the last few years, the
United  States  Congress,  while asserting that it wants to  leave the Internet
alone, has passed some ofthe most protective IP legislation ever in the history
of intellectual property.  It has extended the terms of copyright; it has ratified
the broad set of  protections that IP grants; it has endorsed systems that enforce
the law in the code of the Internet;  it has made resisting this enforcement a
felony.
And not just Congress, but the courts as well.  The federal courts have
husbanded  a revival in strong patent protections.  These patent protections
have been extended to software,  and to business methods that are written in
software in cyberspace.  There are patents  for selling software on the web;
patents for running reverse auctions on the web; patents for ecommerce on the
web; patents for just about every activity you might dream to engage in on the
World Wide Web.  Cyberspace is being littered with claims of intellectual
property; it is becoming filled with suits demanding payment before progress
can continue.  And at the same time, these demands are being supported by a
Congress that is increasingly captured by this ideal of property.
There isn't the time here to  sketch fully  how these IP  rights work;  I
haven't the  space in this hour to  let you  see  fully the complexity of their
claims.  If I have time, I have time only to raise doubts in your mind.  To get
you to ask some very obvious questions.
For some things are undeniable.  While these lawyers race around filing
patents for every idea; while the politicians prance around, promising protec-
tion for Hollywood, funded with the campaign contributions  of Hollywood;
while Congress passes laws turning those who built the Internet into felons;
while they do  all this claiming that unless they  do it, the Internet will not
grow, there is one undeniable fact that they cannot escape:
The Internet  was born  with  none of these protections.  The greatest
growth that our economy has seen in the past hundred years happened in a
world where property rights were practically invisible.  The revolution that57 WASH. &LEEL. REV 337 (2000)
defines the last ten years was a revolution that came about without these laws.
The laws, these protections, the patents, these rights - all of these are coming
long after the revolution has had its effect.
In my view, this explosion of legal protection - the extraordinary  exten-
sion of the power of the state, this turning of every idea into property, this
work that lawyers are doing in cyberspace - all this will have a devastating
effect on cyberspace's future.
But I want to be clear about the nature of the devastation.
I have no doubt that there will be  an Internet in ten years.  I have no
doubt that I'll be able to buy books,  and music, and watch videos  on that
Internet.  I have no doubt that life on that Internet will be fhr more convenient
and simple than life is now.  It will be fhst,  and flashy, there will lots  of
corporate endorsement.
But this explosion of lawyers'  work will have an important effect on the
space.  For what it will do is reempower those who were disempowered bythe
Internet originally.
The  explosion  of copyright won't  mean nothing  gets  written;  it will
simply mean that what gets  written will get written by those who  control
copyrights.  The material, and its  derivatives,  will be the inputs into other
work,  but that  other work will be the work inspired by the owners  of the
inputs.
The same is true about software:  The explosion of patents in software
and  business  methods  won't  mean that investment  in  software  will  end.
Patents  aren't  a problem  for people  who  hold  large  portfolios  of patents
themselves.  When IBM discovers it needs to use a technology held by HP, it
simply trades access to its patents for the access to HP's.  Large institutions -
who can afford expensive lawyers - will be advantaged relative to the small.
And institutions  will be advantaged  relative to open source software.  The
explosion  of patents  will  mean the recreation  of the  large  institutions  of
coding.  For only they will be able to afford the transaction costs of  inventing.
And the same is true about  creation in film.  As  everything becomes
propertized - as every image becomes owned by someone else - the very act
of producing a film requires an army of lawyers to negotiate the rights.  That
means not that film won't get made; it means instead that film will only get
made by those who can afford the lawyers.  The independent will die, or get
sucked into a system where a few large organizations  hold the rights to large
collections of images.
In all three  cases, the explosion of IP rights  is having the very same
effect.  It creates huge costs of negotiating, and it therefore benefits those who
can  negotiate  more  easily.  It makes  it harder  for the  independent,  or the
unaffiliated, or the critical, or the poor, to create; it reinforces the power of  theTHE DEATH OF CYBERSPACE
institutional,  or the affiliated, or the bland to create.  It kills the world the
Internet  created;  it recreates  the world that existed before the Internet was
born.
We live at a time when we haven't the rhetorical resources to resist this
explosion of rights.  We won the cold war; we believe property is the savior;
we vilify or, worse, laugh, at anyone who questions the savior.  And so deep
is our reverence  for this institution of property that when a phenomenon as
significant as the Internet occurs, we don't even notice that it happens without
the support of property.  We don't even notice that it happens because it was
a space free of strong property. And because we don't notice, it seems natural
to us to support the work of lawyers who now argue that unless we recreate
in cyberspace the strong protections  for IP that protect real property in real
space, that cyberspace will die.
Cyberspace will die, or at least the cyberspace that we know.  It will be
killed by these institutions that would recreate the 1970s in HTML.  It will be
killed by an institution that will disable once again the independent, unaffili-
ated,  critical,  questioning  creativity  that the Internet  of the last ten years
produced.
This brief flash of extraordinary  creation.  This  return of Jefferson's
ghost will end.ARTICLES